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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis of the late 2000’s has had a devastating effect on the US economy. The
economics that explains the amplification of such crises pertains to the financial accelerator
model, which states that the supply of and demand for credit depends on interest rates or the
credit rationing model, which suggests that credit is always rationed and interest rates have little
or no effect on it. In this paper, we look at the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation
for large and small firms on a monthly and a quarterly basis. In addition, we also look at the
impact of the current recession on the cost of credit intermediation for small as well as large
firms.
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INTRODUCTION
New Institutional Theories argue that it is conceptually wrong and misleading from a policy
perspective to treat micro variables as constant when analyzing economic relationships at the
macro level. For example, many economists assume that the cost of credit intermediation is the
same for small firms as well as large firms when analyzing the macro economy. In the credit
market, however, there are informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. This
gives rise to two main problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. The idea of adverse
selection deals with the notion that lenders are wary of giving away credit to borrowers because
of the high default risk. The idea of moral hazard, on the other hand, deals with the notion that
the lenders assume the downside risk of an investment made by a borrower on the amount
borrowed.
Because of these problems in the credit market, lenders differentiate between borrowers and
disburse most funds to those borrowers who are deemed to be “credit-worthy”. There are two
theories based on the equilibrium quantity of funds. The financial accelerator model (Bernanke,
et al, 1981) contends that the cost of credit is price-based, and that a relatively “credit unworthy”
borrower has to pay higher prices to get the same level of credit as compared to a “credit worthy”
borrower. The other theory, which is dubbed the Credit Rationing Model (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981), argues that credit is rationed, and that due to this unworthy [and potentially worthy]
borrowers do not get or have minimal access to credit. The theory also contends that the
equilibrium interest rate is not at the market-clearing level, but at a level where the return to the
lenders is the highest.
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The main argument of these two models is that it is easier for big and well-established firms to
get access to credit as compared to small firms , i.e. that the cost of credit intermediation is lower
for large firms or that large firms aren’t rationed whereas small firms are. These models also
argue that during a recession, the difference in the price of credit intermediation for large firms
and small firms increases and this exacerbates recession. The models also argue that during a
recession, the cost of credit intermediation for large and so-called “worthy” borrowers decreases,
but it doesn’t decrease for “unworthy” or potentially worthy borrowers, i.e. small firms. Since
small firms do not get access to credit, these firms are forced to cut back on their investing
spending. As a result, we observe the exacerbation of a recession.
A lot of literature has been generated by these two theories. One of the more recent ones, by
Walker (2010), tests these two theories. In his paper, “Costs of short-term credit for small and
large firms”, he explores the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation for small and
large firms in the short-run. He also explores the impact of these factors on the cost of credit
intermediation for small firms as well as large firms in the long-run. In addition, he examines the
impact of recession on these factors as well as the prices that firms pay for credit.
In our paper, we will follow Walker’s (2010) lead, and test the Financial Accelerator Model and
Credit Rationing Model. The time period of our analysis will be from 1998 to 2011. We will
analyze the cost of credit intermediation for small and large firms, examining what factors are
responsible for their changes in the short run as well as the long run. We will also analyze
whether changes in the cost of credit intermediation are significantly different during a recession
as compared to periods of normalcy. The main goal of this research will be to test if the presence
of agency costs, as implied by the Credit Rationing Model and the Financial Accelerator Model,
7

affect small and large firms differently. This line of inquiry leads to another important question,
are loanable funds markets for small and large firms segmented or do all firms compete for the
same pool of credit? The main variables that will be considered are the cost of credit
intermediation for small as well as large firms, and the quantity of credit obtained by these firms.
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY REVIEW
1.1

New Institutional Theories of Finance

New Institutional Theories of Finance are based on the market failures inside the financial
system. They study the macroeconomic implications of the financial world through the
microeconomic behavior of households, firms, financial markets and banks. In the past,
Keynesian and New Classical models have ignored the complexities of the interactions at the
firm level. To simply assume uniformity at the micro-level when considering the macroeconomy leads to the ignoring of crucial macroeconomic implications. (Knoop, 2008)
The Keynesian and New Classical models consider liquidity, but they fail to distinguish credit
from liquidity. Liquidity deals with the total amount of funds available to lenders. The change in
liquidity occurs when there are changes in the money supply or the level of savings in the
economy. Liquidity is usually measured by the money supply. On the other hand, there are
difficulties when measuring credit, since it deals with the amount of loanable funds that the
financial institutions are willing and able to provide. Another important distinction between
liquidity and credit is the idea of perceived default risk. This idea is more important for the
provision of credit than the interest rate. With respect to this difference between liquidity and
credit, the New Institutional theories of Finance argue that credit may be high when the supply of
money is low and vice-versa. (Knoop, 2008)
Another main idea related to the New Institutional Theories of Finance is the idea of information
asymmetry. Financial markets are imperfect; hence the idea of informational asymmetry between
borrowers and lenders comes into play. This exists because borrowers are more informed about
their credit worthiness than the lenders. If the borrower can convince the lender that he is credit
9

worthy, even if he is not, he gets access to credit. On the other hand, if the borrower cannot show
he is credit worthy no matter how credit worthy he is, he still fails to get access to credit. (Knoop,
2008)
One of the two main problems that arise from the imperfections of financial markets is the
problem of adverse selection. As we know, borrowers with high default risk are more likely to
search for loans since they want to take risks with their own funds as well as others’ funds. Since
lenders are aware of this problem, they are usually not willing to provide credit to everyone who
applies for it. (Knoop, 2008)
The second major problem is referred to as moral hazard. Moral hazard deals with the risky
behavior by the borrower who gained access to credit. The rationale behind this idea is pretty
simple: for the borrower who has been provided credit, the lender assumes part of the downside
risk. On the other hand, if the project is successful, the upside benefit is not distributed in the
same way. The borrower simply needs to return the amount that he had promised to return, and
the remaining profit goes to him. Since there is protection on the downside, and profit in the
upside, borrowers are likely to engage in riskier behavior.
These two problems are factors that determine the supply of credit. Due to these problems, the
quality of information on the part of the borrower is directly proportional to the amount of credit
that the borrower is provided and inversely proportional to the price that the borrower has to pay
to get access to credit. Therefore, small or new firms are at a major disadvantage compared to
big and established firms. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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Since the provision of credit depends upon moral hazard and adverse selection, and not
necessarily upon the interest rates, the credit market is almost always in disequilibrium: supply
for loanable funds rarely equal the demand for loanable funds. (Knoop, 2008)
There are two main models that are derived from the ideas discussed above: the Financial
Accelerator Model and the Credit Rationing Model. We will now look at these two models in
detail.
1.2 The Financial Accelerator Model
The Financial Accelerator Model examines how the asymmetric information due to imperfection
in the financial market exacerbates a financial downturn. Bernanke and Gertler, in their seminal
1996 paper, argue that the cost of credit intermediation of firms, households, and individuals
affects the level of credit in the economy. Consequently, small microeconomic changes can have
a big impact on the economy. (Bernanke et al, 1996)
According to Bernanke and Gertler, the cost of credit intermediation is partly related to interest
rates. The cost of providing information is significant. In this model access to financial
information is costly. In addition, the borrowers also have to face monitoring costs as well as the
opportunity cost of collaterals in some cases. (Bernanke et al, 1996)
As a result of the costs associated with credit, firms seek to finance their projects internally, via
retained earnings. If firms require more finance, they issue debt. If this is not an option for them,
they prefer to raise equity. However, raising equity has serious consequences since re-issuance of
equity dilutes ownership and might send signals to the public that the stock is overvalued, which
is harmful for the firm. (Knoop, 2008)
11

Bernanke and Gertler argue that the cost of credit intermediation is a function of the financial
fundamentals of both borrowers and lenders. They argue that the cost of credit intermediation
does not necessarily depend on debt levels as long as the borrowers have assets that can be
collaterized. In other words, their net worth (total assets – total liabilities) is what the creditors
look at. This determines the financial fundamentals of borrowers. (Bernanke et al, 1996)
To see this, let us assume that we are in a recession, which has hurt a firm’s sales. This has a
negative impact on the net worth of the firm. Since the net worth of the firm has decreased,
lenders would be reluctant to provide this firm with credit. Therefore, the cost of credit for the
firm increases, either through an increase in the interest rate, the increase in the collateral that
firms have to provide in order to obtain credit, or the increase in the information required for
firms to get credit. Let us remember that this occurs when the firms need credit the most. The
inaccessibility of credit would lead to a decrease in the consumption and investment of firms.
This decrease would, then, worsen the recession. (Knoop, 2008)
Let us consider the Economic Model in Fig 1.1. Now let us assume that a recession has occurred.
Due to the recession, the money supply decreases unexpectedly. In addition, there is a decline in
expectations, which reduces consumption and investment, and an increase in perceived risk.
These three factors lead to the shifting of the aggregate demand. In addition, due to the higher
costs of credit intermediation, the aggregate demand falls even more. On the other hand, because
of the higher risk factor and the decrease in capacity (due to the fall in investment), the aggregate
supply shifts upwards to the left. Thus, the equilibrium output is Y3 in figure 1.1. (Knoop, 2008)
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Fig 1.1: Impact of the Financial Accelerator Model on the Economy. (Source: Knoop, 2008)

1.3

The Credit Rationing Model

The Credit Rationing Model suggests that credit is rationed and that access to credit is not
affected by the interest rate. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
Let us see the perspective of the borrower in this model. The borrower defaults on his loan as
long as his return from the project and his collateral is less than the amount he has to pay back
(which is the loan with interest). Thus, the payoff to the borrower would be the greater of the
following: the return from the project minus the loan and interest or the collateral that he will
give away if the loan defaults. The return to the bank, on the other hand, will be the smaller of
the following: the return of the project and the collateral (if the borrower defaults) or the loan
and interest rate (if the borrower pays back). (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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Fig 1.2: Firms’ Profit Functions (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)

From figure 1.2 and the ideas discussed above, we can see that the borrower has downside
protection. Whatever the firm’s payoff from the project, the maximum it can lose is the collateral
(-C in Figure 1.2). In addition its break-even point will be where the return from the project
equals the amount of the loan with interest and the collateral. (R= (1+r)B – C in Figure 1.2).
However, as we can see in Figure 1.2, there is no ceiling to the firm’s profit. This is why highrisk borrowers are interested in borrowing from the banks. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
Let us consider the case of an increase in the interest rates. Risk-averse borrowers will borrow
only up to a certain interest rate, after which only the high-risk borrowers will borrow. Because
of this the profit of the bank will decrease once the risk-averse or the “safe” borrowers pull out.
This is shown in figure 1.3. We can see a sudden drop in the bank’s profit (ρ) at interest rate r1.
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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Figure 1.3: Financial institutions’ profit function in terms of interest rates. (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)

This outcome leads to a theorem derived by Stiglitz and Weiss, which say that the profit function
for financial institutions is not a monotonic function of interest rates. There is a particular r*, the
interest rate, such that the bank will maximize its returns if it charges its borrowers this interest
rate. Therefore, banks will provide credit at the interest rates r*. However, we can see that at this
interest rate, there is an excess demand for credit. Therefore we do not reach the market clearing
condition for credit. Hence, we can see that credit is rationed, and that all who are in need of
credit for do not have access to it. This is shown in figure 1.4. In the figure we can see that the
market clearing condition is at the interest rate rm but the equilibrium is at r^*. At this
equilibrium it is evident that there is an excess demand: borrowers are willing and able to borrow
more at a higher interest rate. Since it is not profitable for the lender to do so, he will not provide
credit at a higher interest rate. It is also evident that the lender maximizes its returns when it
provides credit at r^*. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
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Figure 1.4: The loanable funds market with the lender’s profit function. (Source: Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)

The rationing of credit leads us to an important question: if credit is rationed, how do banks
differentiate credit-worthy customers from the ones that are not credit worthy? Large and wellestablished firms have access to credit, and small firms, which are usually private, might not
have access to credit all the time.
The idea of credit limits is important here. Large firms have higher credit limits than small firms
(Knoop, 2008).

The role of credit limits is very important in the credit-rationing model.

According to this model, a small shock to the economy will not have a significant impact on
credit as long as the borrowers are well within their credit limits. It is only when the borrowers
are near their credit limits that a small shock will lead to a large reduction in credit available to
them. During a recession, the credit limits of borrowers are lowered. Thus firms that are in need
of credit do not have access to credit. The credit limit is tighter for newer, smaller, and private
firms in comparison with well-established, larger, and public firms. (Knoop, 2008) The recession
gets escalated in the same way as described in the Financial Accelerator Model.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, both the financial accelerator model and the creditrationing model help explain the exacerbation of economic downturns. However, these models
have overlooked some factors related to credit intermediation. This idea will be explored in this
chapter.
The financial accelerator model suggests that after an adverse macroeconomic shock, borrowers
will have access to a lower amount of credit, and due to this, their economic activity will also
decline. This is explained by the presence of agency costs. In a recession, due to the presence of
higher agency costs, the borrowers (small-sized firms) face a greater decline in their spending
and production, and also their revenue than borrowers (large-sized firms) who do not have such
difficulty in obtaining credit. Therefore, the theory predicts that large size firms (who have
access to credit) and small size firms who are subject to agency costs are affected differently in
an economic downturn. If some firms rely entirely on internal funding and require zero credit,
then the financial accelerator model doesn’t come into play. (Bernanke et al, 1993)
Ben Bernanke et al (1993) have actually explained this phenomenon and tested the model with
quarterly data pertaining to small and large-scale firms in the manufacturing industry. The
authors differentiated between large-scale and small-scale firm on the basis of sales. In their
paper, “The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality” (1993), they analyzed three
variables for these firms: short-term debt, sales, and inventories between the time period of 1979
and 1992. They found substantial differences between these variables pertaining to large firms in
comparison with the variables pertaining to smaller firms.
observe these differences in the graph below.
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(Bernanke et al, 1993) We can

Fig 2.1: The difference between small and large firm cumulative growth rates: a comparison of industry adjusted vs.
unadjusted data. (Source: Bernanke, et al 1993)

Bernanke, Gertler, and Glichrist also examined the commercial paper spread. During conditions
of tightened money supply and/or access to credit, firms switched from borrowing to issuing
18

commercial paper. When firms are in need of short-term credit they prefer to use commercial
paper rather than depend on intermediated credit. However, only high-grade borrowers (large
well-established firms) have greater access to commercial paper market and they get funds more
easily than low-grade borrowers (small firms).

It is the case that small firms cannot use

commercial paper to acquire funding and they rely on intermediated credit. Thus, this is
consistent with the financial accelerator model. (Bernanke et al, 1993)

The theory also discusses how access to credit changes as a function of the intensity of the
recession. When an economy is in a deep recession, the difficulty of obtaining credit for firms is
going to be more than in a “not-so-deep recession” and this relationship is not linear. Therefore,
deep recessions are amplified more than proportionately than not-so-deep recessions due to the
availability of credit.
Although this model generally states how costs of credit intermediation affect large firms and
small firms differently in a period of economic downturn, this model doesn’t take into
consideration the possibility of a deflation independent of an economic downturn. In a period of
deflation, we do see the net worth of firms decreasing and this is independent of the change in
aggregate output. (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989)
When there is an unanticipated fall in the price level, even if there is no recession, a borrower’s
net worth decreases. Because of this previously credit-worthy borrowers become “uncreditworthy.” These “uncredit-worthy” borrowers suddenly find themselves without funds to generate
their investments. As a result, the total level of investment in the economy decreases, and this
has negative effects on the aggregate supply as well as the aggregate demand. Therefore, this
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phenomenon helps an economy plunge into an economic downturn. The same analysis can be
applied to households.
In his analysis of the non-monetary based explanation of the financial crisis during the great
depression, Bernanke argues that the reduction in money supply was an unsatisfactory
explanation to the fall in output. Furthermore, he argues that during the recession, the banking
crises increased the cost of credit intermediation, and that higher costs of credit intermediation
had a relationship with the decline in aggregate output. (Bernanke, 1983)
He argues that depositors withdrew their deposits during the crisis fearing runs. This action,
along with the financial institutions’ desire to have liquid assets led to a “contraction” of their
role in credit intermediation. This contraction greatly affected the class of borrowers, which
includes households, farmers, unincorporated businesses, and small corporations. In addition, he
also mentions that the demand-side of the economy was also affected by the higher costs of
credit intermediation. Higher borrowing costs meant that households were forced to decrease
their demand for current goods and services. This implies a downward shift of the aggregate
demand, resulting in lower output. (Bernanke, 1983)
Craig Hakkiko and Troy Davig have extended this study in an attempt to explore the effect of
financial stress on economic activity. In addition to the financial accelerator model, they have
also described the “real options theory” as a theory that helps describe the connection between
financial stress and economic activity. According to the real options theory, during financial
stress, uncertainty is high. Thus, it is profitable to wait until the economy goes to a stage of less
uncertainty. Hence, investors prefer to wait than invest in a period of stress. On the contrary,
when the economy is in a period of low uncertainty (when it is not under financial stress),
20

extreme outcomes are very unlikely. Thus, there is no point waiting in order to carry out projects.
(Davig and Hakkio, 2010)
Hakkiko and Davig test their data using the Regime-Switching model, for two periods, distressed
and normal. The variables they used were the Kansas City Federal Reserve’s Financial Stress
Index (KCFSI) to measure financial stress, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI)
to measure economic activity. They found that there was a negative correlation between KCFSI
and CFNAI in both periods, but the correlation was higher, in absolute terms, during the
distressed regime. They also noticed that the volatility of both KCFSI and CFNAI were higher in
the distressed regime than in the normal regime. (Davig and Hakkio, 2010)
In addition, according to their findings, when the probability of distress regime approaches one,
the CFNAI is lower than the KCFSI, and CFNAI is higher than the KCFSI when the probability
of distress regime approaches 0. The difference in absolute values in CFNAI and KCFSI is
higher when the probability of distress regime approaches 1. (Davig and Hakkio, 2010) This is
shown in Fig 2.2
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Fig 2.2: Probability that the Economy is in the Distressed Regime
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, and Troy David and Craig
Hakkiko

The credit-rationing model, as has been discussed, states that credit is rationed, and access to
credit doesn’t depend on the cost of credit intermediation. Stiglitz and Weiss, by proving a
number of theorems, have shown that credit is rationed, and the optimal quantity of credit is not
at the equilibrium, but rather at a point where the return to the financial institution is the greatest.
Stilgitz and Weiss, by building on the ideas of informational asymmetry, moral hazard, and
adverse selection proved the following:
1. “For a given interest rate r*, there is a critical value of t (project) such that a firm will
only borrow if and only if the project is greater than the critical value.”
2. “As the interest rate increases the critical value of t increases.”
22

3. “The expected return on a loan to a bank is a decreasing function of the riskiness of the
loan.”
4. If the types of borrowers are different, then the profit function for the financial institution
will not be a monotonic function because when groups of borrowers drop out of the
market (due to mostly changes in the interest rate), the profit drops.
5. “As the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds decreases.” However,
since this theory entails interest rates being sticky, interest rates do not change as long as
there is credit rationing.
Note: For the diagrams explaining this phenomenon, please look at section 1, figures, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.

Stilgitz and Weiss also introduce the idea of collateral requirements in their analysis. When the
demand for credit increases, financial institutions might not necessarily increase their collateral
requirements, thus reducing their rate of default because this action may not necessarily mean
that these institutions will experience an increase in their returns. This is because smaller firms
have small projects that have a high probability of failure. If the financial institutions increase the
collateral requirements, smaller firms may still be able to meet those requirements and gain
access to credit. However, since these projects have a higher probability of failure, increasing the
collateral requirement may lead to an increase in the riskiness of the loans.
Stiglitz and Weiss’ seminal paper is primarily a theoretical contribution and in it they do not test
their theories empirically. Although it is a formidable task to test whether credit rationing occurs
or not (since financial institutions seldom give out information about their credit policies), many
economists have tried to address this issue. In their paper “Do Firms Get the Financing They
Want?”, Alec R. Leveson and Kristen L. Willard test whether credit rationing really exists.
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In their paper, they test their hypothesis that credit rationing does not exist. They tackle the
ambiguity associated with credit rationing. They refute the notion that firms that were
discouraged from applying due to the fear that their application will get rejected do not belong to
the firms that are credit-rationed. Furthermore, they introduce the idea of time in terms of credit
rationing, which had been ignored by Stiglitz and Weiss in their analysis. Furthermore, Leveson
and Willard argue that firms that did not gain access to credit in the time they wanted to but got
the required funds eventually cannot be characterized as credit-rationed firms.
In their analysis, Willard and Leveson found out that 6.36 percent of the U.S. small businesses
during the period of 1987-88 had an “unfulfilled desire for credit”. But these firms only
accounted for 3.22 percent of the total sales and 3.46 percent of the total employment among all
firms that were included in the study. Of the 6.36 percent of the firms that were rationed, only
about a third of these firms were denied credit. The remaining either didn’t apply or got the funds
eventually. This result along with the negative correlation between firm size and credit denial
suggests that the credit-rationing model may not work in real life. (Levenson and Willard, 2009)
The two theories also discuss how the bank lending is being reduced either through the creditrationing mechanism or the rise in interest rates during economic downturns. However, it is
imperative for us to take into account why there exists a decline in bank lending during
recessions. In a study done by Jim Wilkinson and Jon Christensson of the Kansas City Federal
Reserve in 2011, there was evidence that changes in bank capital and problem assets affected the
amount of bank lending during the recent “Great” recession. The study observed that raising the
bank capital requirement would be effective as a policy instrument. If there is a rise in bank
capital, however, it might still not be the case that small businesses will get access to credit.
24

Although the financial accelerator model and the credit rationing models imply that small firms
find it difficult and costly to get access to credit during times of economic downturn, both of
these theories fail to consider the possibility that there is a weak demand for credit from qualified
small business owners. It might be the case that the small firms do not want access to credit,
under any cost, because they fear weak sales and poor prospects. Therefore, they plan to cut back
their operations rather than expand them. According to the survey by the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, twenty-seven percent of the firms were concerned about bad sales,
whereas only three percent were worried about not being able to get access to credit. In addition,
although recessions “are likely” to decrease the firms’ internal finance, it might be the case that
firms, at least in a particular area, had no access to credit markets not just only during recessions,
but all the time. (Wilkinson and Christensson, 2011)
Some economists have also argued that there is a relationship between the debt capacity of a firm
and cost of asset sales, and debt capacity deteriorates during a recession. They attribute the
notion of asset illiquidity to this problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that in an economic
downturn, small firms have trouble meeting debt payments and their assets are usually liquidated
and sold. The highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are usually competitor firms.
During financial distress, the competitor firms are unlikely to raise enough capital to purchase
the other firms’ assets. As a result, assets would be sold to industry-outsiders who do not manage
these assets as well as the firms that are in the industry. Due to this reason, the industry-outsiders
would have to hire specialists to operate those assets. They also wouldn’t know the actual value
for the asset. Thus they fear paying higher costs in regard to buying and operating the assets. As
a result, they buy the assets in a price below what could have been the price paid if the asset were
to be used inside the industry. This increases costs for the already credit-constrained firms,
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reduces their net worth, and decreases their debt capacity. As a result, they will face higher costs
of credit intermediation and this amplifies the downturn. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992)
Kitoyaki and Moore (1997) explain this idea through what they call the predator-prey model.
They describe the debt levels of a firm as the predator and its landholdings as the prey. They
argue that given a rise in a firm’s landholdings, it’s net worth increases, which allows it to
borrow more. On the other hand, higher debt levels decrease the funds that are available to the
firm and might imply liquidation and forced selling of the land. Kiyotaki and Moore also take
into consideration the price of land, which causes the economy to react more to a shock.
(Kiyotaki and More, 1997)
The idea of the economy falling into pieces after a financial crisis is also explored by Hall (2010).
In his paper, Hall introduces the idea of “financial friction”, which deals with a cost to one side
of the transaction which is not a benefit to the other side of the transaction. He also argues that
financial friction has the same effect on the economy as a property tax on capital. In addition, he
claims that the events in September 2008 led to an increase in credit spreads, which is consistent
with the financial accelerator model. Furthermore, he argues that a critical component of the
credit spread is financial friction. He also underscores the idea that the rise in credit spread led to
the widespread of credit rationing, and this resulted in the diminishment of the firms’ ability to
finance the “acquisition of capital goods”, which in turn resulted in the cutback of all types of
investment in the economy. Thus, the recession persisted.
Until this point, we have been discussing economic downturns under the assumption that the
financial institutions themselves are not adversely affected by the downturn. In those recessions,
as we have discussed above, financial institutions did give out credit to businesses even if the
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credit was either rationed or there were higher costs of credit intermediation. The reason for this
was that investors withdrew their wealth from securities and deposited it in banks. But what if
financial institutions are at the center of an economic downturn? In a recent study done by the
Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, it is suggested that during financial institutions-centered
financial crises, the financial institutions that supply credit found it “harder to attract deposits”.
In addition, it is believed that depositors looked for safer ways to invest, such as the US Treasury
Bonds. This is consistent with the theory of “flight to safety”. Therefore the level of credit
supplied in such recessions will be less than the level of credit supplied in other recessions. This
implies that in such recessions, the financial accelerator model tends to exacerbate the economic
downturn even more. (Mora, 2010)
Furthermore, it is imperative for us to take into account why there was a decline in bank lending
during recent recessions. Changes in both bank capital and problem assets appeared to play a role
in the decline in bank lending during the recent “Great” recession. In a test done by Wilkinson
and Christensson, they have shown that during the recent recession and financial crisis, business
lending by community banks had decreased by sixteen percent. During this period, problem
loans and loan loss provisions increased as well. (Wilkinson and Christensson, 2011)
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
As discussed in the previous chapters, the cost of credit is different for large firms and small
firms. The primary motive of this paper is to examine whether the difference in cost of credit
intermediation between small and large firms is significant in periods of recession as well as
other periods.
It is also a formidable task to obtain data pertaining to the cost of credit intermediation for small
as well as large firms. Therefore, proxies have been used to represent cost of credit
intermediation for the firms. In order to search for suitable proxies, it must be evident that they
are highly correlated with the cost of credit intermediation for large as well as small-sized firms.
(Walker, 2009) It has been argued in this paper that large firms are usually credit worthy, and
credit worthy borrowers usually borrow at the prime rate. Therefore the Prime Rate has been
used as a proxy for the cost of credit intermediation for large firms. The Prime Rate is used as a
proxy for the analysis of both monthly variables as well as quarterly variables (PRIMONTH and
PRIQ, respectively). In addition, it has also been argued that cost of credit intermediation is
higher for smaller firms. The cost of credit intermediation for small and independent firms is a
mixture of the interest rate they pay on short-term interest rates and the interest rate they pay on
credit card. According to the National Federation of Independent Businesses, 92 percent of
small businesses/firms use one or more credit cards. Thus, the interest rate on credit cards
(CREDCARDQ), released by the Federal Reserve, has been used as a proxy for the cost of credit
intermediation for small firms. However, these rates are only generated by the Federal Reserve
on a quarterly basis (Feb, May, Aug, and Nov of every year). In order to compare the cost
differentials on a monthly basis, the paper uses actual monthly interest rate paid by small
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businesses on short term loans (INTRM), generated by the National Federation of Independent
Businesses. (Walker, 2009) The time period for the analysis is from January 1998 to December
2011. These variables are endogenous, whereas the other variables, which are discussed in this
chapter, will be tested for weak exogeneity.
Before specifying the model, it was imperative that the data be tested for non-stationarity. This
needed to be done because:
a. When we deal with a non-stationary time series, it is possible for us to study its behavior
only for a particular period under consideration since each period will be a different
episode, which cannot be generalized for other periods. Therefore, a non-stationary time
series will not be of much use for forecasting purposes.
b. If we are dealing with two or more time series and run Ordinary Least Squares
Regression, it might lead to spurious regressions. Spurious regressions occur when we get
a very high R-squared and significant t-statistics for the regression coefficients. However,
these results are not reliable since OLS assumes that the time series are stationary.
(Gujarati, 2011)
One of the methods of testing for non-stationarity is the unit root test. The Augmented-Dickey
Fuller Test is used to detect whether the time series in question are non-stationary or not.
The series, PRIMONTH, PRIQ, INTRM, and CREDCARDQ will be tested for non-stationarity.
The three equations used to test for non-stationarity are given below:
1. ∆Yt = β1 + β2t + β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 + β5 ∆Yt-2 +….+ βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for random walk
with drift around a deterministic trend)
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2. ∆Yt = β1 + β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 + β5 ∆Yt-2 +….+ βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for a random walk with
drift)
3. ∆Yt = β3Yt-1+ β4 ∆Yt-1 + β5 ∆Yt-2 +….+ βn+2 ∆Yt-n + εt (to test for a random walk)
Where Y = PRIMONTH, PRIQ, INTRM, and CREDCARDQ.
If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in equation 1, and the trend is not
significant, then the second equation will be used. If the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
cannot be rejected and the intercept is not significant, the third equation would be used. If null
hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot still be rejected, it will be concluded that the time series is
a pure random walk.
The first differences of the time series will then be taken into consideration. If the time series
becomes stationary (i.e. the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected), the time series is
said to be difference stationary or integrated of order one. If it has to be differenced twice to
make it stationary, it is said to be integrated of order two.
Once the time series are tested for non-stationarity, the two sets of time series, monthly and
quarterly, were tested for co-integration. Two variables are co-integrated if they have a long-term
relationship. Therefore any probability of spurious regressions between cointegrated variables is
0. The variables were also tested for cointegration in order to determine whether an error
correction term would be needed in the later regressions or not, i.e., a model which reconciles
both the short run and long-run behavior of these variables.
Cointegration between two variables can be tested by using the Engle-Granger test. It should be
noticed that this test can only be used if there are only two variables in question. For more than
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two variables, the Johannsen test must be used.

Since this is a test to find if there are

cointegrating relationship between INTRM and PRIM and PRIQ and CREDCARDQ, it is
suitable to use the Engle-Granger Test. In the Engel-Granger test, one of the two variables is
regressed against the other. The residual from this regression is, then, tested for unit root. If the
residual is stationary, it is concluded that the two variables are cointegrated, and the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected.
However, the Engel-Granger test may give contradictory results at times. As stated above, the
Johannsen Test is another method of finding whether the two time series in question are
cointegrated. Under this test, the null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between the
time series in question. When we are dealing with n variables, the test results indicate if we
can/cannot reject the null hypotheses of 1,2,..,(n-1) cointegrating equations.
After the data have been tested twice for cointegration, using different tests, it could be
concluded whether the time series are cointegrated or not.
If either the PRIMONTH and INTRM or PRIQ and CREDCARDQ are found to be cointegrated,
an Error Correction Model should be used to correct the disequilibrium that arises between the
short and long run behavior of the included variables. The Error Correction term is used to
connect the short run behavior of a variable to its long-run value.
The next thing will be to analyze what factors affects PRIMONTH, INTRM, PRIQ and
CREDCARDQ. Depending on whether or not these variables are stationary or not, the variables
will be taken in either their level terms or their first differences. However, if they are co-
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integrated, the VECM model will be used, which takes into account the differences and not the
level terms.
The variables that might explain the changes in PRIMONTH and INTRM have been chosen
following Walker’s (2010) lead. These variables are the Federal Funds Rate Monthly (FFM),
INDEXM (the Business Borrowing Index Monthly released by the NFIB), and QBORSM
(percentage of firms borrowing at least once every quarter, released by NFIB). These variables
are either in their level values or differenced values. A unit root test will determine whether these
variables are stationary or not. If they are stationary, their level values will be taken; otherwise,
their differenced values will be used to set up the model, given that they are difference-stationary.
The next step would be to use a VAR/VEC model to analyze the relationship between the
dependent variables, PRIMONTH and INTRM and the exogenous variables FFM, INDEXM,
and QBORSM. However, it needs to be established that the explanatory variables are exogenous.
This can be done using the Block Granger Causality test. If at least one of these variables turns
out to be endogenous, a co-integration test must be performed using the variables that are
endogenous, PRIMONTH and INTRM. Since there would be more than two variables that need
to be tested for co-integration, the Johansen test must be performed.
The VAR model is similar to a system of simultaneous equations. The only difference is that, in
the VAR model, the current values of the dependent variable are not present in the right hand
side of the equation. The model doesn’t differentiate between exogenous and endogenous
variables; therefore each system of equations will have the same number of regressors. The
number of lagged terms will be the same throughout all systems of equations. Another important
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reason for using the VAR model in this analysis is that with the use of this model, the impact of a
variable can be determined as well as simultaneous impact multipliers.
A critical requirement of the VAR model is that all the time series variables are stationary. If the
variables mentioned above are not stationary or difference stationary, then the VAR model
cannot be applied to this analysis.
The system of VAR model will be as follows:

ΔPRIMONTHt =

β1L

Δ INTRMt

β1S

+

∑

βkLL βkLS

ΔPRIMONTHt-k

βkSL βkSS

ΔINTRMt-k

+

∑

α1S

Xt

α2S

+ ε1
ε2
,where X is not an endogenous variable. As we have discussed before these variables, including
PRIMONTH and INTRM are either in their level values or differences depending on whether
they are stationary or not.
Similarly, the system of VAREC equation would be:

ΔPRIMONTHt =

β1L

ΔINTRMt

β1S

+

∑

βkLL βkLS ΔPRIMONTHt-k

βkSL βkSS
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Δ INTRMt-k

+

∑

α1S

α2S

Xt

+ µ1

EC t-1 + ε1

µ2

ε2

where EC is the Errror Correction term. EC t-1 = PRIMt + α0 + α1INTRMt
The same analysis is going to be applied to the quarterly data, the monthly variables being
transformed into quarterly variables with the exception of some variables. The proxy variable for
the quantity of funds obtained by small firms on a quarterly basis is QCARDQ, which is the total
credit card borrowing and is the sum of the revolving and non-revolving credit obtained. The
data is released by the Federal Reserve. This replaces QBORSM.
The next step will be to verify the long term relationship or the impact multipliers. To analyze
the long term relationship between variables, all the lagged terms and the present terms must be
equated. For instance, to see the long term relationship in the monthly data, the level terms of
FFM, QBORSM, and INDEXM will be used. A restriction, PRIMONTHt = PRIMONTHt-1 =
PRIMONTH t-1 and so on, will also be used to determine the long-run impact. (or ΔPRIMONTHt
= ΔPRIMONTHt-1 = Δ PRIMONTH t-1 if PRIMONTH is non-stationary. The same procedure
will be undertaken for INTRM and CREDCARDQ and PRIQ.
Once the long-run values are calculated, the next step in the analysis would be to compare the
data in periods of recession and periods of normalcy or growth. For this reason, a new binary
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variable RECESSIONB is obtained, which has values of 1 during a recession and values of 0
during periods of normalcy or growth. The data is obtained through NBER.
The same analysis will be done, but now a dummy variable for the intercept would be used as
well as the slope dummy variable. The values of the binary variable have been determined with
respect to the data released by NBER identification of 2001 and 2007. The new binary variable,
R, has a value of 1 during a recession and a 0 when there was no recession. The new variables
will be R, R*QBORSM, R*INDEXM, and R*FFM for the monthly data, and R, R*QCARDQ,
R*FFQ, and R*INDEXQ. The significance of these variables is going to be tested. Depending on
whether these variables are significant, we can determine whether the cost of credit
intermediation during a recession is different between small and large firms as well as it being
different in periods of normalcy versus periods of recession.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
4.1 Unit root tests
As we are discussing the factors that affect the cost of credit intermediation for small and large
firms, we need to check whether the proxy variables are stationary or not. We have used the
Augmented-Dickey fuller test and followed the Doldado et al (1990) procedure and the results
are follows:
1. Variable: PRIMONTH
Null Hypothesis (H0) = PRIMONTH has a unit root.
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.809054

0.6961

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

0.087017

0.057785

1.505882

0.1340

@TREND(1998M01)

-0.000322

0.000286

-1.124132

0.2626

Here, it can be observed that the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected; however the
intercept and trend coefficients are not significant as well.
B. Test for Unit root for intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.416687

0.5731

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error t-Statistic

Prob.

C

0.032477

0.031413 1.033894

0.3027
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Again, the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected; however the intercept is not significant.
C. Test for Unit root without intercept and trend

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.302243

0.1776

The null hypothesis of a unit root can still be not rejected, and it can be observed that this time
series is a pure random walk.
D. Test for difference-stationarity
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆PRIMONTH has a unit root.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-5.265297

0.0000

Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that the PRIMONTH is
difference-stationary, and that PRIMONTH is integrated of order 1, or I(1).
2. Variable: INTRM
Null Hypothesis(H0): INTRM has a unit root.
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-2.573689

0.2930

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

0.489220

0.207229

2.360767

0.0195
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@TREND(1998M01)

-0.000923

0.000659

-1.400372

0.1634

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, but it can be observed that the
intercept is significant at the 5% level.

B. Test for Unit root using the intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.200990

0.6736

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

0.123607

0.131669

0.938771

0.3492

The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not
significant anymore.
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.479160

0.1298

Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected.
Therefore, it can be concluded that INTRM is non-stationary. The next step is to check whether
INTRM is difference-stationary or not.
D. Test for difference-stationarity
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆INTRM has a unit root.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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t-Statistic

Prob.*

-18.50543

0.0000

Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that INTRM is differencestationary, and that INTRM is integrated of order 1, or I(1).
3. Variable: PRIQ
Null Hypothesis(H0): PRIQ has a unit root.
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept

t-Statistic
-2.460392

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Coefficient
0.203792
-0.000701

Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Std. Error
0.095657
0.000471

t-Statistic
2.130435
-1.487400

Prob.*
0.3474
Prob.
0.0347
0.1389

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, but it can be observed that the
intercept is significant at the 5% level.
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept
t-Statistic
-1.954350

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Coefficient
0.084167

Variable
C

Std. Error
0.051985

t-Statistic
1.619042

Prob.*
0.3069

Prob.
0.1074

The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not
significant anymore.
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-1.263481

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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Prob.*
0.1895

Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected.
Therefore, it can be concluded that PRIQ is non-stationary. The next step is to check whether
PRIQ is difference-stationary or not.
D. Test for difference-stationarity
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆PRIQ has a unit root.

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-3.331908

0.0000

Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that PRIQ is differencestationary, and that PRIQ is integrated of order 1, or I(1).
4. Variable: CREDCARDQ
Null Hypothesis (H0): CREDCARDQ has a unit root.
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
0.406507
-0.000338

Std. Error
0.279276
0.000473

t-Statistic
-1.588209

Prob.*
0.7938

t-Statistic
1.455574
-0.713723

Prob.
0.1474
0.4764

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, and neither the intercept nor the
trend is significant at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level.

B. Test for Unit root using the intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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t-Statistic

Prob.*

-1.200990

0.6736

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

0.123607

0.131669

0.938771

0.3492

The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not
significant.
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-1.308892

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.1756

Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected.
Therefore, it can be concluded that CREDCARDQ is non-stationary. The next step is to check
whether CREDCARDQ is difference-stationary or not.
D. Test for difference-stationarity
For this test, the null hypothesis is that ∆CREDCARDQ has a unit root.
t-Statistic
-12.80625

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0000

Therefore, the null hypothesis can be rejected and it can be concluded that CREDCARDQ is
difference-stationary, and that CREDCARDQ is integrated of order 1, or I(1).
4.2 Tests for Cointegration
4.2.1

Test for Cointegration between INTRM and PRIMONTH

Since both INTRM and PRIMONTH are non-stationary, we need to check if they are
cointegrated. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this needs to be done to check whether the
VAR or the VEC model should be used in the analysis involving these two variables. Since there
are only two variables that are in question, the Engel-Granger test is used. As mentioned in the
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previous chapter, PRIMONTH is be regressed on INTRM and the residuals are saved. In this
analysis, the residuals are stored as EC. EC is then tested for non-stationarity. Under the unit
root test, the Null Hypothesis is that EC is non-stationary.
A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-2.297345

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
0.045964
-0.000535

Std. Error
0.062522
0.000640

Prob.*
0.4326

t-Statistic
0.735159
-0.835403

Prob.
0.4633
0.4048

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected; however the coefficients of the
trend variable and intercept are not significant.
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C

Coefficient
0.000172

Std. Error
0.030045

t-Statistic
-2.218388

Prob.*
0.2006

t-Statistic
0.005715

Prob.
0.9954

The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected; however, the intercept is not
significant.
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-2.225729

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0255

Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5%
level. Therefore, it can be concluded that EC is stationary. Hence, INTRM and PRIMONTH are
cointegrated. Therefore, the VEC model should be used to analyze the factors that affect the
changes in INTRM and PRIMONTH.

42

In order to confirm this result, the Johansen procedure (1988-91) is performed. The number of
lags used for this test is 1. The results are summarized below:
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

0.05
Critical Value

Prob.**

None *
At most 1

0.151361
0.013857

29.56054
2.316294

15.49471
3.841466

0.0002
0.1280

This test is used to examine the number of cointegrating equations. We can reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegrating equation between PRIMONTH and INTRM at the 0.1% level;
however we cannot reject the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating equation between
PRIMONTH and INTRM at the 10% level. Therefore, INTRM and PRIMONTH are uniquely
cointegrated.
4.2.2 Test for Cointegration between PRIQ and CREDCARDQ
Since both PRIQ and CREDCARDQ are non-stationary, we need to check if they are
cointegrated. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this needs to be done to check whether the
VAR or the VEC model should be used in the analysis involving these two variables. Since there
are only two variables that are in question, the Engel-Granger test is used. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, PRIQ is regressed on CREDCARDQ and the residuals are saved. In this
analysis, the residuals are stored as ECQ. ECQ is then tested for non-stationarity.

A. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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t-Statistic
-1.253599

Prob.*
0.8953

Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
0.022121
-0.000374

Std. Error
0.050167
0.000521

t-Statistic
0.440952
-0.717112

Prob.
0.6598
0.4743

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected; however the coefficients of the
trend variable and intercept are not significant.
B. Test for Unit root using the intercept
t-Statistic
-1.101650

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Variable
C

Coefficient
-0.009463

Std. Error
0.023983

t-Statistic
-0.394575

Prob.*
0.7147

Prob.
0.6937

The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can still not be rejected, and the intercept is not
significant.
C. Test for Unit root without trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-1.106302

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.2431

Again, it can be observed that the null hypothesis for non-stationarity cannot be rejected.
Therefore, the residuals are not stationary. It can be concluded that CREDCARDQ and PRIQ are
not cointegrated. In order to confirm this result, the Johansen procedure (1988-91) is performed.
The number of lags used for this test is 1. The results are summarized below:
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

0.05
Critical Value

Prob.**

None

0.019042

3.881462

15.49471

0.9129

The null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation cannot be rejected. Therefore at the 5% level,
there is no cointegration between PRIQ and CREDCARDQ
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4.3 TESTS FOR EXOGENEITY
We have to perform a test for exogeneity to ensure the exogeneity of FFM, QBORSM, and
INDEXM for monthly data and FFQ, QCARDQ, and INDEXQ for quarterly data.

4.3.1 Tests for exogeneity of the monthly variables
A Block Granger Causality test for exogeneity was performed and the results of the test are as
follows:
a. Variable: FFM
Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)
Excluded
Chi-sq

df

Prob.

33.13260
2.178612
34.27836

2
2
4

0.0000
0.3364
0.0000

Dependent variable: D(FFM)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIMONTH)
2.010149
D(INTRM)
1.251031
All
3.238653

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.3660
0.5350
0.5187

Dependent variable: D(INTRM)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIMONTH)
13.51886
D(FFM)
1.774424
All
67.06046

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.0012
0.4118
0.0000

D(FFM)
D(INTRM)
All

Here, we can see the null hypothesis of ∆FFM not causing ∆PRIMONTH can be rejected at a
very significant level, but the null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆FFM cannot be
rejected. Therefore, there is only a one-way relationship between ∆PRIMONTH and ∆FFM. In
the case of ∆INTRM and ∆FFM, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM not causing
∆FFM and ∆FFM not causing ∆INTRM. Hence we can conclude that ∆FFM is not endogenous.
b. Variable: QBORSM
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Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)
Excluded
D(QBORSM)
D(INTRM)
All

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.7949
0.5976
0.8426

Dependent variable: D(QBORSM)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIMONTH)
4.079816
D(INTRM)
1.178268
All
4.625865

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.1300
0.5548
0.3279

Dependent variable: D(INTRM)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIMONTH)
65.65220
D(QBORSM)
1.343829

df
2
2

Prob.
0.0000
0.5107

4

0.0000

All

Chi-sq
0.459151
1.029635
1.409052

66.45391

Here, we can see the null hypothesis of ∆QBORSM not causing ∆PRIMONTH, as well as the
null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆QBORSM cannot be rejected . Therefore, there is
no relationship between ∆PRIMONTH and ∆QBORSM. In the case of ∆INTRM and
∆QBORSM, we can observe similar results. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM
not causing ∆QBORSM and ∆QBORSM not causing ∆INTRM. We can conclude that
∆QBORSM is not endogenous.

c. Variable: INDEXM
Dependent variable: D(PRIMONTH)
Excluded
D(INDEXM)
D(INTRM)

Chi-sq
2.118170
1.248083

df
2
2

Prob.
0.3468
0.5358

All

3.078016

4

0.5449

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.0074
0.0449
0.0022

Dependent variable: D(INDEXM)
Excluded
D(PRIMONTH)
D(INTRM)
All

Chi-sq
9.825101
6.207281
16.71681

Dependent variable: D(INTRM)
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Excluded

Chi-sq

df

Prob.

D(PRIMONTH)
D(INDEXM)

67.09858
2.786025

2
2

0.0000
0.2483

All

68.48541

4

0.0000

Here, we can observe that the null hypothesis of ∆INDEXM not causing ∆PRIMONTH cannot be
rejected; however, the null hypothesis of ∆PRIMONTH not causing ∆INDEXM can be rejected
at a very significant level. Therefore, there is a one-way relationship between ∆INDEXM and
∆PRIMONTH. We can also observe that the null hypothesis of ∆INTRM not causing ∆INDEXM
can be rejected at the 5% level. However, the null hypothesis that ∆INDEXM not causing
∆INTRM cannot be rejected. Therefore, there is a one-way relationship between ∆INDEXM and
∆INTRM. We can conclude that ∆INDEXM is weakly exogenous.
The test results indicate that all of the variables that we are concerned about (QBORSM,
INDEXM, and FFM) are not endogenous.

4.3.2 Tests for exogeneity for the quarterly variables.
Variable: FFQ

Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(CREDCARD
Q)
0.013579
D(FFQ)
0.000151
All
0.014068

Df

Prob.

2
2
4

0.9932
0.9999
1.0000

Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIQ)
0.000628
D(FFQ)
0.000107
All
0.018871

Df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.9997
0.9999
1.0000

Dependent variable: D(FFQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq

Df

Prob.
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D(PRIQ)
D(CREDCARD
Q)
All

0.000878

2

0.9996

0.013509
0.014402

2
4

0.9933
1.0000

The results indicate that we cannot reject the null hypotheses of ∆CREDCARDQ not causing
∆FFQ, ∆FFQ not causing ∆CREDCARDQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆FFQ, and ∆FFQ not causing
∆PRIQ. Hence we can conclude that ∆FFQ is not endogenous.
Variable: QCARDQ
Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(CREDCARD
Q)
0.016341
D(QCARDQ)
0.663591
All
0.677567
Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIQ)
0.032764
D(QCARDQ)
0.471352
All
0.490172
Dependent variable: D(QCARDQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIQ)
0.633331
D(CREDCARD
Q)
0.224366
All
0.681696

df

Prob.

2
2
4

0.9919
0.7176
0.9541

df
2
2
4

Prob.
0.9838
0.7900
0.9745

df
2

Prob.
0.7286

2
4

0.8939
0.9536

The results are similar to those of ∆FFQ. We cannot reject the null hypotheses of ∆QCARDQ
not causing ∆PRIQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆QCARDQ, ∆QCARDQ not causing ∆CREDCARDQ
and ∆CREDCARDQ not causing ∆QCARDQ. Therefore, we can conclude that ∆QCARDQ is
not endogenous.

Variable: INDEXQ
Dependent variable: D(PRIQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(CREDCARD
Q)
0.011273
D(INDEXQ)
0.009720

df

Prob.

2
2

0.9944
0.9952
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All

4

0.9999

Dependent variable: D(CREDCARDQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
df
D(PRIQ)
0.023127
2
D(INDEXQ)
0.006912
2

Prob.
0.9885
0.9965

All

0.023638

0.025677

Dependent variable: D(INDEXQ)
Excluded
Chi-sq
D(PRIQ)
0.002468
D(CREDCARD
Q)
0.000856
All
0.004918

4

0.9999

df
2

Prob.
0.9988

2
4

0.9996
1.0000

Again, the results are very similar to the results obtained above. We cannot reject the null
hypotheses of ∆INDEXQ not causing ∆PRIQ, ∆PRIQ not causing ∆INDEXQ, ∆INDEXQ not
causing ∆CREDCARDQ and ∆CREDCARDQ not causing ∆INDEXQ. Therefore, we cannot
conclude that ∆INDEXQ is exogenous even though we can conclude that ∆INDEXQ is not
endogenous.

4.4 THE MODEL
A critical requirement of the VAR/VAREC model is that all time series in question be stationary.
Therefore the next step is to check whether the variables that might affect (the exogenous
variable are stationary.

4.4.1 Tests for stationarity of Monthly Variables
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Walker’s (2009) lead is followed. The variables are
∆FFM, ∆QBORSM, and ∆INDEXM. We also need to check the stationarity of the level values
of these variables in order to construct the impact multiplier model. In order to check the
stationarity of variables, the ADF-test for unit root, following the Doldado et al (1990) procedure.
is performed. The test results are discussed below:
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a. Variable: FFM
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept

t-Statistic
-1.800233

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
0.054383
-0.000350

Std. Error
0.041939
0.000298

t-Statistic
1.296719
-1.173104

Prob.*
0.7005
Prob.
0.1966
0.2425

2. Test for unit root using intercept
t-Statistic
-1.363982

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C

Coefficient
0.010109

Std. Error
0.018311

t-Statistic
0.552098

Prob.*
0.5988
Prob.
0.5816

3. Test for unit root without trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic
-1.527638

Prob.*
0.1185

The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in all three
tests. The trend was not significant in the first test and the intercept was not significant in the
first as well as the second test. The p-value of the ADF test statistic in the third test is almost
significant at the 10% level. This compelled us to perform other tests for stationarity. The DFGLS test was performed and the results are given below:
t-Statistic
-3.466794

Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic
Test critical values:

1% level
5% level
10% level

-3.508000
-2.970000
-2.680000
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The results of the DF-GLS test indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected.
Thus, we can conclude that FFM is stationary.
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆FFM is stationary or not. The ADF Test
for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below:

t-Statistic
-5.40704

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0000

As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level.
Therefore, ∆FFM is stationary.
b. Variable: INDEXM
1. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-3.624057

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
14.04378
0.010669

Std. Error
3.883052
0.004275

t-Statistic
3.616687
2.495673

Prob.*
0.0308
Prob.
0.0004
0.0136

The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5% level.
The results also show that the constant as well as the trend are significant. Thus, we conclude
that INDEXM is stationary.

For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆INDEXM is stationary or not. The ADF
Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below:
t-Statistic
-9.931625

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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Prob.*
0.0000

The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected. Hence,
∆INDEXM is stationary.
c. Variable: QBORSM
1. Test for Unit root using trend and intercept
t-Statistic
-5.060611

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
14.69186
-0.009747

Std. Error
2.910157
0.003994

t-Statistic
5.048476
-2.440516

Prob.*
0.0003
Prob.
0.0000
0.0157

The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5% level.
The results also show that the constant as well as the trend are significant at the 5% level. Thus,
we conclude that QBORSM is stationary.
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆QBORSM is stationary or not. The
ADF Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below:
t-Statistic
-14.56497

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0000

Again the test result shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very
significant level. Therefore, ∆QBORSM is stationary.

4.4.2 TESTS FOR STATIONARITY OF QUARTERLY VARIABLES
The variables for the quarterly data analysis are ∆FFQ, ∆QCARDQ, and ∆INDEXQ. The EngleGranger test is performed to test the stationarity of the quarterly variables. The results from the
test are discussed below:
a. FFQ
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1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept

t-Statistic
-2.159381

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Coefficient
0.12460
-0.000743

Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Std. Error
0.077215
0.000545

t-Statistic
1.613676
-1.362767

Prob.*
0.5086
Prob.
0.1086
0.1749

2. Test for unit root using intercept
t-Statistic
-1.670836

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C

Coefficient
0.029806

Std. Error
0.033610

t-Statistic
0.886817

Prob.*
0.4442
Prob.
0.3765

3. Test for unit root without trend and intercept

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

t-Statistic
-1.601402

Prob.*
0.1028

The results indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected in all three
tests. The trend was not significant in the first test and the intercept was not significant in the
first as well as the second test. The p-value of the ADF test statistic in the third test is almost
significant at the 10% level. This compelled us to perform other tests for stationarity. The DFGLS test and the KPSS test were performed and the results are given below:
t-Statistic
-1.227099

Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test statistic
Test critical values:

1% level
5% level
10% level

-2.579404
-1.942818
-1.615392
LM-Stat.
0.713283
0.739000
0.463000
0.347000

Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic
Asymptotic critical values*:
1% level
5% level
10% level
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The results of the DF-GLS test indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected,
even at the 10% level. The results of the KPSS test show that the null hypothesis of stationarity
can be rejected at the 5% level. Thus, we can conclude that FFQ is not stationary.
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆FFQ is stationary or not. The ADF Test
for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below:
t-Statistic
-3.894196

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0001

As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level.
Therefore, ∆FFQ is stationary.
b. ∆INDEXQ
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept

t-Statistic
-2.805761

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.1975

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
@TREND(1998M01)

17.99574

6.403492
0.005993

2.810300
2.101246

0.0056
0.0373

0.012594

The results from the ADF test indicate that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be
rejected. The trend and the intercept are significant at the 5% level.
For our short run model, we need to determine whether ∆INDEXQ is stationary or not. The ADF
Test for stationarity was run again and the results are shown below:
t-Statistic
-12.84523

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic

Prob.*
0.0000

As the result shows, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at a very significant level.
Therefore, ∆INDEXQ is stationary.
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c. QCARDQ
1. Test for unit root using trend and intercept

t-Statistic
-3.077464

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Variable
C
@TREND(1998M01)

Coefficient
39903.27
233.4228

Std. Error
12363.02
79.73325

t-Statistic
3.227632
2.927546

Prob.*
0.1154
Prob.
0.0016
0.0040

The results from the ADF test (where the intercept and the trend are highly significant) indicate
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level. However the p-value of
the test statistic is very close to 10. This compelled us to perform stronger tests of nonstationarity to confirm the results given by the ADF test. The Phillips-Perron test and the KPSS
test were performed. The results from these tests are given and discussed below:
Phillips-Perron test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

Adj. t-Stat
-1.765794
-3.469691
-2.878723
-2.576010

Prob.*
0.3965

LM Stat
0.255670
0.216000

Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic
Asymptotic critical values*:
1% level

The results from the Phillips-Perron test show that we cannot reject the null hypopthesis of nonstationarity, whereas the results from the KPSS test indicate that we can reject the null
hypothesis of stationarity at 1% significance. Hence, we can conclude that QCARDQ is not
stationary.
For the analysis of the short-run effects, we need to determine whether ∆QCARDQ is stationary
or not. The ADF test was used to test for stationarity. The results are given below:
t-Statistic
-1.144033

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
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Prob.*
0.2294

Here, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected, even at the 20% significance.
This result is surprising, given that all other variables were difference stationary. This compels us
to perform stronger tests for non-stationarity. The Phillips-Perron test and the KPSS test are
applied to test whether the result shown by the ADF unit root test is reliable. The results from
these two tests are discussed below:
1. The Phillips-Perron Test Result
Adj. t-Statistic
-13.52452

Phillips-Perron test statistic

Prob.*
0.0000

The Phillips-Perron test clearly shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. The
adjusted t-stat is highly significant.
2. The KPSS Test Result
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic
Asymptotic critical values*:
1% level 0.739000
5% level 0.463000
10% level 0.347000

LM-Stat.
0.323012

The KPSS test result is very consistent with the Phillips-Perron test. The null hypothesis of
stationarity cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Therefore, we can conclude that ∆QCARDQ is
stationary, and using the ADF test results would have led to a type II error.
4.4.3 VEC MONTHLY MODEL
A. Short Run Model
Now that the requirements for the VEC model are satisfied in terms of the exogenous variables,
the model can be set up. As discussed in the previous chapter, the model is:
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Δ PRIMONTHt = β1L

+ β2LL

β1S

Δ INTRMt

+ α3L

β2LS ΔPRIMONTHt-1

β2SL β2SS

∆INDEXMt

α3S

+

α2S

Δ INTRMt-1

+

µ1

EC t-1

α1L ∆FFMt

+

+ α2L

∆QBORSMt

α2S

ε1
ε2

µ2

For this model, we have only used one lagged value of the dependent variable because the
AIC/SBC criterion suggested it. The results of this model are shown and discussed below:
The cointegrating equation is: EC t-1 = PRIMt-1 - 5.173 + 1.433INTRMt-1
(-24.22)
D(PRIMONTH)
0.176182
(0.03549)
[ 4.96425]

D(INTRM)
0.034765
(0.15998)
[ 0.21731]

D(INTRM(-1))

-0.004802
(0.01553)
[-0.30918]

-0.319304
(0.07001)
[-4.56085]

C

0.000155
(0.00477)
[ 0.03238]

-0.018980
(0.02151)
[-0.88235]

D(FFM)

0.807552
(0.03135)
[ 25.7619]

0.338442
(0.14130)
[ 2.39522]

D(INDEXM)

0.001120
(0.00228)
[ 0.49211]

0.005567
(0.01026)
[ 0.54270]

D(PRIMONTH(-1))

D(QBORSM)

-0.002569
(0.00174)
[-1.47659]
Table 4.1: Results of the VECM Monthly Model

0.006897
(0.00784)
[ 0.87945]

Interpretations of the model:
a. ∆PRIMONTH has a significant positive autoregressive relationship with its own lagged
value, whereas ∆INTRM has a significant negative autoregressive relationship with its
own lagged value.
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b. ∆PRIMONTH and ∆INTRM both do not have significant autoregressive relationships
with each other’s lagged values.
c. ∆PRIMONTH and ∆INTRM both have significant positive relationship with ∆FFM. The
coefficient of ∆FFM in the model concerning ∆PRIMONTH is almost 2.5 times the
coefficient of ∆FFM in the model concerting ∆INTRM.
d. The intercept is insignificant in both models.
e. ∆PRIMONTH does not have a significant relationship with either ∆QBORSM or
∆INDEXM. Similarly, ∆INTRM does not have a significant relationship with either
∆QBORSM or ∆INDEXM. Therefore, there is no significant relationship between price
and quantity in terms of monthly data.
B. Impact multipliers and Long run equilibrium
For the long run equilibrium values, we assume that ∆PRIMONTH

t-1

= ∆PRIMONTHt =

∆PRIMONTH. Similarly we also assume that ∆INTRM t-1 = ∆INTRMt. = ∆INTRM. The long
run equilibrium coefficients are given below. In order to measure the long-run impact, we have
taken level values of the exogenous variables as compared to taking the differenced values for
the short-run analysis. Since INDEXM, QBORSM, as well as FFM are stationary time series, we
were able to use the level values for the analysis.
∆PRIMONTH

∆INTRM

INDEXM

0.0009116

0.0030699

QBORSM

-0.0071857

0.0040791

0.8055881

0.1101336

FFM
Table 4.2: The monthly impact multipliers
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Interpretations of the Monthly Impact Multipliers:
Since INDEXM is a proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by big firms, and QBORSM is a
proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by small firms, it can be observed (table 4.2) that both
small and large firms are paying higher prices for larger quantity of funds; however, the cost of
credit intermediation is higher for the small firms relative to large firms. The cross quantity
elasticity coefficient is negative in the PRIMONTH model, whereas it is positive in the INTRM
model. This suggests that the larger quantity small firms borrow, the lesser the cost of credit
intermediation for large firms. On the other hand, these results also suggest that the larger
quantity big firms borrow, the larger the cost of credit intermediation for small firms. An
increase in FFM increases the cost of credit intermediation for small firms as well as big firms.

4.4.3 VAR QUARTERLY MODEL
The requirements for a VAR Quarterly Model are met in terms of the exogenous variables.
Therefore, the model can be set up. As we have discussed in the last chapter, the VAR model is
as follows:

ΔPRIQt

=

β1L
β1S

Δ CREDCARDt

+

β2LL β2LS
β2SL β2SS

α2L ∆QCARDQt
α2S

+

+

ΔPRIQt-1

α1S

ΔCREDCARDQt-1

α3L ∆INDEXQt
α3S

+

ε1
ε2
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α1L ∆FFQt

+

In order to get consistent and comparable results with the monthly data, a lag length of one is
taken. The VAR output is given on the next page.

D(PRIQ)
D(PRIQ(-1))

D(CREDCARDQ(-1))

C

D(QCARDQ)

D(INDEXQ)

D(FFQ)

D(CREDCARDQ)

-0.001814

0.003488

(0.01912)

(0.05656)

[-0.09488]

[ 0.06166]

-0.001710

0.003288

(0.02549)

(0.07541)

[-0.06708]

[ 0.04359]

-0.006098

0.011727

(0.00571)

(0.01688)

[-1.06882]

[ 0.69463]

1.12E-06

-6.06E-06

(5.5E-07)

(1.6E-06)

[ 2.04198]

[-3.75210]

0.007741

-0.009009

(0.00204)

(0.00605)

[ 3.78791]

[-1.48978]

0.931686

0.239644

(0.01758)

(0.05203)

[ 52.9837]
Table 4.3 Results from the VAR Quarterly Model

[ 4.60570]

Model Interpretations :
a. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both do not have significant autoregressive relationships
with their own lagged values.
b. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both do not have significant autoregressive relationships
with each other’s lagged values.
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c. ∆PRIQ and ∆CREDCARDQ both have significant positive relationship with ∆FFQ. The
coefficient of ∆FFQ in the model concerning ∆PRIQ is almost 4 times the coefficient of
∆FFQ in the model concerting ∆CREDCARDQ.
d. The intercept is insignificant in both models.
e. ∆PRIMONTH has a significant positive relationship with ∆INDEXQ as well as
∆QCARDQ. On the other hand, ∆CREDCARDQ has a significant negative relationship
with ∆QCARDQ but has an insignificant relationship with ∆INDEXQ. Therefore, we can
conclude that the market for funds for small and big firms is not segmented.
B. Impact multipliers and Long run equilibrium
For the long run equilibrium values, we assume that ∆PRIQ t-1 = ∆PRIQt = ∆PRIQ. Similarly we
also assume that ∆CREDCARDQt-1 = ∆CREDCARDQt. = ∆CREDCARDQ. The long run
equilibrium coefficients are given below. We could not take the level values to measure the longrun impact of the quarterly exogenous variables on the changes of cost of credit because these
variables were not stationary.
∆PRIQ

∆CREDCARDQ

∆FFQ

0.9300

0.2405

∆QCARDQ

1.1179E-6

-6.0812E-6

∆INDEXQ

0.0074

-0.0090

Table 4.4 The Quarterly Impact Multipliers

Interpretations of the Quarterly Impact Multipliers:
Since INDEXQ is a proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by big firms, and QCARDQ is a
proxy for the quantity of funds borrowed by small firms, it can be observed that large firms are
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paying a higher price for a larger amount of funds, whereas small firms are paying lower price
for a larger amount of funds. The cross quantity elasticity coefficient is positive in the PRIQ
model, whereas it is negative in the CREDCARDQ model. This suggests that the more quantity
small firms borrow, the higher the cost of credit intermediation for large firms. On the other hand,
the larger the amount of funds borrowed by the larger firms are, the lesser the small firms have to
pay for a certain amount of funds.

An increase in FFM increases the cost of credit

intermediation for small firms as well as big firms; however the change in prices for large firms
is about 3 times the change in prices for small firms, which is consistent with the monthly
variable analysis. These results do contradict the financial accelerator hypothesis, but it also must
be noted that we used the differences rather than level values to estimate the impact multipliers.

4.4 IMPACT OF RECESSION ON THE MODEL
As we have discussed in previous chapters, the cost of credit intermediation increases for smallsized firms. This idea is consistent with the idea of the financial accelerator and the credit
rationing model, which state that an economic downturn gets amplified due to the increase in
cost of credit intermediation. Therefore, it is of great interest to determine whether the cost of
credit intermediation does increase during a recession, and whether the difference between the
cost of credit intermediation for small firms and big firms is going to rise. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the same analysis was repeated with the use of the dummy variable. The tstatistics of the tests mentioned in the last chapter are noted below.
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4.4.1 Effects of Recession on Monthly Data
Intercept
∆(PRIMONTH)

∆(INTRM)

R

-3.11

-0.36

R* ∆INDEXM

-3.06

-0.37

R* ∆QBORSM

-3.30

-0.42

R* Both

-3.24

-0.21

Card Rate Equation
∆(PRIMONTH)

-1.59

∆(INTRM)

Prime Rate Equation
∆(PRIMONTH)

∆(INTRM)

1.34

-0.17

1.20

-0.21

-0.44

Note: The t-statistics are rounded off to 2 decimal places

Table 4.5: T-statistics for recessionary monthly binary model

For the monthly model, wherever the t-statistics are significant, the credit prices are lower during
the recession. The t-statistics of the intercept model are significant at the 1% level for
∆PRIMONTH. Therefore, the credit prices for large firms decrease during a recession. On the
other hand, the credit prices for ∆INTRM do not change since none of the recession coefficients
for ∆INTRM are significant even at the 10% level. The other recession coefficients for
∆PRIMONTH are not significant at the 10% level. Thus, it can be concluded that in a recession,
the credit prices for large firms decrease and they stay the same for small firms, hence widening
the difference in their cost of credit intermediation.
4.4.1 Effects of Recession on Quarterly Data
Intercept

Card Rate Equation

∆PRIQ

∆CREDCARDQ

∆PRIQ

R

-6.48

-0.43

R* ∆INDEXQ

-6.13

-1.09

R* ∆QCARDQ

-6.42

0.45

0.38

0.45

R* Both

-6.07

-1.06

0.43

0.36

Note: The t-statistics are rounded off to 2 decimal places

Table 4.6: t-statistics for recessionary binary quarterly model
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∆CREDCARDQ

Prime Rate Equation
∆PRIQ

∆CREDCARDQ

2.00

-4.04

2.00

-4.02

For the quarterly model, the credit prices show mixed responses to recession. The t-statistics of
the intercept model are negative and are significant at the 1% level for ∆PRIQ. Therefore, the
credit prices for large firms decrease during a recession. In the quarterly prime rate models, on
the other hand, the t-statistics for ∆PRIQ are positive and significant, which implies that credit
prices increase for large firms in a recession. This is not a matter of concern for us since the tstatistics for ∆PRIQ in the intercept model are greater, in absolute terms, than the t-statistics of
∆PRIQ in the prime rate equation. Thus, the net effect is going to be negative. On the other hand,
the t-statistics for ∆CREDCARDQ are negative and significant at the 1% level. However, the RSquared values of these models were so low (0.002 and 0.096,), as compared to the PRIQ model
that we can ignore the effect of the recession on the prices for credit for small firms. As a result
we conclude that the credit prices for large firms decrease and stay constant for small firms,
hence widening the difference in their cost of credit intermediation during a recession. These
results are consistent with the theory discussed in Chapter 2.
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CONCLUSION
By and large, both the monthly and quarterly results reported in this thesis are consistent with the
theories described in the earlier chapters. In both cases, the cost of credit intermediation for small
firms and large firms responded to the same economic and financial factors. In addition, the
reported estimates also suggest that the impact of economic recession on the cost of credit
intermediation was significant. The results suggest that the cost of credit intermediation decrease
in a recession; however the decrease appears to be larger in the case of big firms as compared to
that of small firms.
The changes in the cost of credit intermediation for small firms as well as large firms were
affected by changes in the federal funds rate; however, the reported estimates suggest that the
positive change in the federal funds induces a bigger increase in the price of credit for large firms
as compared to the price of credit for small firms. In the analysis for the monthly data, the
estimates suggest that the price of credit, for both small and large firms, did not respond to the
changes in the quantity of credit borrowed in the short-run. As a result, it was not possible to
refute the null hypothesis that the market for credit intermediation is not segmented between
small and large firms.
To determine which variables affected the cost of credit intermediation for the monthly data in
the long-run, this study considered the level values of the variables. The results from the analysis
indicate that the quantity borrowed by large firms had a positive impact on the cost of credit
intermediation for both types of firms, and the impact was greater for the small firms as
compared to the larger firms. In addition, the results suggest that an increase in the quantity
borrowed by smaller firms resulted in a decrease in the cost of credit intermediation for larger
65

firms, but led to an increase in the cost of credit for small firms. This result is consistent with the
financial accelerator model and the credit rationing model. It also clearly suggests that the credit
markets for small firms and large firms are not segmented in the long run.
For the quarterly data, the cost of credit intermediation for large and small firms responded to
similar economic and financial factors in the short-run. The cost of credit intermediation for both
types of firms had a significant positive relationship with changes in the Federal Funds Quarterly
Rate. However, a positive change in the Federal Funds Rate induced a greater rise in the cost of
credit intermediation for large firms as compared to the cost of credit intermediation for small
firms. This result is consistent with those obtained from the monthly data analysis.
In terms of the cost of credit intermediation responding to changes in the quantity borrowed for
the quarterly data, it was shown that a positive change in the quantity borrowed by large firms
increases their cost of credit intermediation. In addition, changes in the cost of credit for small
firms had a negative relationship with changes in the quantity borrowed by small firms but a
positive relationship with the quantity borrowed by large firms. These results are puzzling. The
theories argue that it should be the opposite because of the imperfections in the credit market.
The long-run impact multipliers reported for the quarterly data could not be estimated because
the variables associated with the quantity borrowed were not stationary. Therefore, the
differenced values were taken into consideration, and the results obtained are consistent with the
results obtained for the short-run for the quarterly data.
The introduction of the effects of economic recession into the model generated results that were,
by and large, consistent with the theories discussed in this paper. For the monthly data, the

66

estimates suggest that a recession decreases the price of credit for large firms, but did not change
the cost of credit intermediation for the small firms. Therefore, the reported estimates suggest
that during a recession the gap between the prices of credit for small firms and large firms
widened.
The results obtained from the impact of economic recession for the quarterly data were very
similar to those obtained for the monthly data; however, there were some anomalies in the
reported estimates. In general, they suggest that the cost of credit intermediation decrease during
a recession. The decrease appears to be greater in the case of the cost of credit intermediation for
large firms. Therefore, the results are still consistent with the theories discussed in this thesis.
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